

1912. 8927.1
A MILITARY
DISCOURSE

Whether it be better for

ENGLAND

TO

Give an INVADOR present Battle,

OR TO

Temporize and defer the same.

WITH AN

APPENDIX

Nennius a worthy Briton, the very Patern of a
valiant, noble, and faithful Subject, encountering with
Julius Caesar, at his first coming into this Island, was by
him Death-wounded, yet nevertheless he gat *Caesar's*
sword, put him to Flight, slew therewith *Labinus* a Tri-
bune of the *Romans*, endured Fight till his Country won
the Battle, died after Days after.

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of Gray's-Inn, Esq;

L O N D O N

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and shall take his estate



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
The following are the names of the persons who have been appointed as members of the Board of Directors of the Bank of America, New York and Mexico, since the last meeting of the Board:

Mr. J. P. Morgan
Mr. C. D. Conover
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MA O C V O E

1941



TO HIS

GRACE

THE DUKE OF

ARGYLE.

MY LORD,

HAVING lately, amongst
some other valuable Pa-
pers of the late Sir *Wal-*
ter Raleigh, found the following
Desertation in Manuscript, I thought
the publication thereof was a Debt
due to my Country, as well as to
the Memory of that great Man.

A 2 And

The Dedication.

And knowing no Person, now living in this Island, who, in the late Wars against *France*, has given more illustrious Proofs of his Knowledge in Arms, or of more signal Courage in executing the most arduous Enterprizes, than Your GRACE has done, to the manifest Danger of your Life, upon many Occasions, I could not think of any one, to whose Consideration I might more properly address this Treatise, than to Your GRACE; and therefore I hope You will have the Goodness to indulge the Liberty I take in. To doing.

Yet, if that celebrated Historian *Salust*, when he saluted *Cæsar*, was not (as he owned himself) sufficiently qualified for such a Task; how much more must I think myself at a Loss, to know in what Manner I should approach one more

The Dedication.

more superior to me, than *Cæsar* was to *Salust*?

Foreign as well as Domestick Historians, unanimously acknowledge that Your GRACE's Predecessors, the truly antient *Caledonians*, put a stop to the Extension of the *Roman Empire*, over the Northern Part of this Island; so it is equally well known, that Your GRACE's Family signally opposed and contributed to put a stop to the Growth of the *Roman Religion*, in the late King *James the Second's* Reign.

And as it is generally allowed that of all the present Successors of that brave People, the *Caledonians*, Your GRACE's Family, and numerous Dependants, make now by much the brightest and most considerable Figure in the Arts, both of Peace and War, so I hope,

The Dedication.

I may be allowed to proffer that those many Honours, Imploys, and Hereditary Prerogatives which Your GRACE and Family now enjoy, are but the natural Fruit of Your GRACE's own, and great Ancestor's, just Merit.

Here I have a large Field to expatiate upon, with respect to Your GRACE's Abilities and Performances, both in the Cabinet and the Field, were my Pen equal to the Subject: But that I may not therein offend Your GRACE's known Modesty, or expose my own Incapacity, I beg leave to borrow and apply here, the Compliment that *Horace* made to *Cæsar*, on the like Occasion.

*In publica Commoda peccem,
Si longo sermone morer tua tempora.*

All

The Dedication.

All I shall add is, that I am,
with the most profound Respects,

MY LORD,

Your GRACE'S

Most Obedient, and

Most Humble Servant,

N. Booth.

A

The Dedication.

All I shall add is, that I am,
with the most profound respects,

MY LORD,

Yours Grace's

Most Obedient, and

Most Humble Servant,

N. Booth.



Military Discourse, &c.



FORASMUCH as in every doubtful and questionable matter, it is familiar and common amongst Men to be diverse and contrary in Opinion; according to the old Saying, *So many Men, so many Minds*. Every Man must therefore prepare himself with a good and equal Contentedness, to endure what others do censure and judge of his Position; and either their Reason shall lead them, or their Sense and Humour carry them; neither ought any Man challenge greater prerogative to his Opinion, than he bringeth with him authority of Reason for the same; and seeing that Reason, joined with Experience, is the only Guide to direct us in all Affairs of Action, whereunto all our Opinion and Judgment must be restrained, it is requisite we should so frame and fashion our Minds, as to submit our private Concerns and Phantasies to be ruled and figured by that Frame and Pattern, which every Man, in every Friend ought to behold and imitate. Now in things of great importance and weight, as it behoveth to be very considerate before we resolve and set down acertainly,

B

which

which we intend to pursue ; so in this matter of War there are some points so difficult, as may minister occasion, and question of long debate, very hardly to be decided ; unless those Controversies be recommended to Men of staid and approved Judgment, who are not carried away with corrupt and common Opinion, but advised and perswaded by the greater strength of reason, confirmed by Experience, and the Presidents of like examples ; which course I have in this Treatise endeavoured to follow (differently from my Profession) to take pen in hand, and become an Author upon occasion, that having long since in private, exhibited a final Pamphlet to some of the LORDS of Her Majesty's most Honourable Privy Council, containing a few brief positions and reasons touching the preventing of the designs of an Enemy Invador, and finding those reasons and opinions lately impugned by a Gentleman of good worth, and his Discourse committed to Print, I have been forced (the Cause being so weighty as it is, and my positions concerning the same, so true and necessary, as I am still perswaded) to uphold and fortify my former Arguments, with such further proofs of reason and examples, as the matter will permit to be alledged, and my judgment enable me to alledge ; And albeit I have been always, and am yet of opinion, that no Man can set down in writing, a rule or method precisely to be observed in War, (the same being rather to be printed, by long practice and experience, in a Soldier's breast, to be executed

cuted as Time, Matter, and Ground doth minister Occasion; upon the Accident of any thing in which there may be also required a new Form and Order to be used accordingly) yet partly provoked by the wrong Conceit of my Opposite, but chiefly, and principally moved with a dutiful zeal and affection to my Prince and Country, I would not be silent in a matter of so great Moment, the Fault and Error whereof might happen to come too late to be repented, if it be not foreseen in time and reformed. For a Prince cannot any way more dangerously hazard his Realm and Country than by giving an Invador Battle at his first landing, as hath been heretofore the usual Custom. And since amongst things of greatest Importance that may concern the Prince and his Kingdom, a People their Liberty and Goods; it is a matter especially to be considered and resolved upon before-hand; by what Means a Royal Army coming to invade and conquer, might be best prevented and defeated; it shall be very requisite and needful that we have recourse unto the Actions and Events of prime and great Persons that have had the managing of like Causes, whose Examples, together with the Reasons of their Doings, may direct to a true Judgment of the Premises. And although I mist my Disability in holding Argument with the Gentleman, in respect of his Learning and Dexterity of Wit, yet having so great an Advantage of the Matter and Cause, as I take it, I have been encouraged to make Reply against his Resolu-

tion. Now, before I proceed any further in this Question, I have thought good for your better Understanding, first to set down the Reasons alledged on both Sides, as I find briefly collected by himself; and after my Reply to his Objections, refer myself in the end to the Censure and Judgment of the Reader, that is a Soldier, and can judge; not caring in this Cause for the Disallowance of any that will only bring a Pound of old antique Usages and Customs to weigh down an Ounce of true Reason, and fresh Experience; and here ensueth the same, entituled by him as followeth,



A brief Discourse what Orders were best for repulsing of Foreign Force, if at any time they should invade us in Kent, or elsewhere.

Here follow in the Margin, certain brief Answers to the old accustomed Orders and the Reasons thereof produced and alledged by the Gentleman.

Not many good successes can be as I suppose alledged.

THE accustomed Order hath been by firing of the Beacons to put the Shire in Arms, and presently all Forces to repair to the landing Place, there, without Delay, to give them Battle; but because there are other Opinions, I think it first convenient to set down the Reasons of our Opinion; and then a Resolution what I think best.

Such as maintain this old accustomed Order alledge, (beside the good Successes that many times it hath taken) that in Reason also it is best dealing with the Enemy at the Landing

Landing; before he hath firm Footing, and before he shall have leisure to range his Men in due Order of battle, and before he shall be able to land his Ordnance, Horse, and Carriage; and that a very few Men this in time, shall be able to give greater Annoyance, and do greater Service upon the Enemy than sometimes so many, when the Enemy is landed and settled in Strength of Order, with all his Horse, Ordnance, and Carriage; they also add these Reasons ensuing for Confirmation of their Custom.

It might be so if the Enemy would acquaint you before where he would land.

The Reasons.

First, the Fury of the Country upon the first Firing of the Beacons is great, every Man (*pro aris et focis*) violently running down to the Sea Side, to repel the disordered Enemy at the first confused Landing; which Fury, if we suffer to grow cold, we shall not so easily inflame again.

The greater Fury the less Reason, and therefore it is to be suppressed in an Army, as a Depriver of all Direction and Order, and not to be inflamed. It is no great Difficulty to land Men both strongly and orderly.

Secondly, every Man knoweth what great Advantage they have that have firm Footing on Land to encounter an Enemy, that must land out of Boats in a confused, stragling manner, and therefore more willingly and speedily will go to enjoy the benefit of this Advantage; whereas if we suffer the Enemy to land, and put himself to military Order, he becometh more terrible unto us.

Also while the Enemy is landing, if he find any Difficulty or Danger (being in Boats) they are ready to retire to their Ships again; but if they be once landed with their

He is a filthy Invador that upon a difficulty will make a Retreat.

their Artillery, Horse and Carriage, &c. it is not then possible for them to retire to their Ships again, without extreme danger of their Lives upon the Retreat; and the dishonourable Loss of all their Munition, &c. and therefore Necessity inforcing them to fight, and all hope of Escape by Fight being then taken away from them, they become ten times more dangerous Enemies to deal withal than before.

It is not the Sight of the Enemy which will cause them to discover themselves, but his prosperous Success in the first Combat, which even in that Respect is to be avoided.

Suffered to land quietly was laid in respect the Enemy would land whether you would or no.

Further, there is in this Realm (as in all States divided in Religion) no small Number of traiterous Minds, who having time to confer, and seeing an Enemy of Force then landed, may and then will discover their Malice, which on a sudden they dare not nor cannot.

Another Opinion.

Some others hold this old Custom of running down to the Sea Side to be a barbarous Custom, void of Order and warlike Discipline, very perilous to ourselves, not hurtful to the Enemy, but rather a Means to loose all; and therefore wish (by special Commandment) that Order of Repair to the Sea Side be refrained; and the Enemy suffered to land quietly, and in the time, to drain, and to carry away all Cattle, Victuals, Forrage, Carriage, &c. and certain Places of the Assembly appointed (a good Distance off the Sea Side) from whence they may march in warlike Order, and so by draining and carrying away all Victuals and fortifying of Streights and Passages to weary out the Enemy with time.

The

The Reasons of the second Opinion.

First, it is said, the invading Enemy bringeth a select Company of disciplined and well trained Soldiers, whom we seek to encounter, with a confused Multitude of Men untrained, in whose Match there is no Comparifon, but Loss certainly.

Again, it is said, an Enemy of Force, meaning to land, will do it in despite of us, and then the Country offering to repel them, and finding themselves not able, grow much more fearful, than if quietly, without Resistance, we had suffered the Enemy to land,

Again, where we suffer the Enemy to land we may drive away all Cattle and Provision further into the Country, and then maintain Streights and Passages well fenced and fortified, so as the Enemy shall be enforced to approach us upon our own Strength and Fortifications, to his great Peril and Danger.

Again, they say, if in this manner we keep Victuals from them by Land, and her Majesty's Navy also in the mean time keep the Seas, the Enemy, for want of Victuals only, shall be forced to retire, and glad to withdraw himself.

Further, it is alledged, how doubtful a thing Battle is; and how dangerous for a King to commit his Crown upon it; and therefore that temporizing Course extolled.

These I think the Reasons most effectual to impugn the speedy Repair to the Sea Side,

It had been
good to have
alleged some
Precedents.

Side, and to maintain the other Opinion, for suffering the Enemy to land quietly, and by draining and carrying away Victuals and Forrage, and fortifying the Streights and Passage, by Time and Famine to weary the the Enemy; but having attentively weighed the Reasons on both Sides, and by Experience of former Invasion, examining the Success and Sequel of like Attempts; as I am far off from allowing any confused disorderly running to the Sea Side, to encounter a select, trained, well disciplined Enemy invading, so am I utterly against the second Opinion, *viz.* To suffer the Enemy quietly to land all his Forces, Munition, &c. not doubting, but a mean Course far more serviceable than either of them both may be taken, whereby the Benefit of that old Custom may be embraced; and the Disorders of the other, well noted, may be reformed; and no Advantage to annoy the invading Enemy omitted, as by these Reasons ensuing better may be judged.

*The Gentleman's Reasons and Resolutions
against the second Opinion.*

First*, I say one of the chief Forces of this famous Island of *England* consisteth in this, that it is fortified naturally with such

* It is as well subject to Invasion as if it were annexed to the Continent of our Navy, which may be called our Sea Case Mates, did not flaucke the Ditch and Trench better than theirs, neither was it ever meant they should be suffered to land, but that our Navy should give them all possible Annoyance both before, and in landing.

a Trench or Ditch as the Sea is; whereby it is not so subject to Invasion as other Countries lying on the Main; which singular Benefit and peculiar Advantage of this our Country is utterly lost, if we suffer the Enemy quietly to land all his Forces, Munition, &c. and to take firm footing on the Main.

Again, Whereas this noble Island hath such a number of Mariners, and good Shipping, both of his Majesty's Royal Navy, and also of Merchants, as may hope, with good Success, to encounter on Sea the Force of any foreign Enemy, we lose as great part of the Benefit of this our Strength, if, relying on this second Opinion, we should suffer the Enemy quietly to land, and then temporize afterwards.

Again, There is no Man of any mean Experience, but knoweth with what danger Men land out of Boats, if there be any mean Force before landing to resist them; for if the while any Storm arise, the Sea alone fighteth for us, and with any small Resistance on Land, will drown great numbers of our invading Enemies.

Also, any small Trench on Land, shall lodge Shot in Safety, to spoil as many of our Enemies, as in Boats shall offer to land before they can approach the Shore.

* Also in landing before they can have time to put themselves in Order, what an Execution may a far less number of Bills, or

* True if the Enemy would not resist you with a far greater Force than can possibly be gathered together on such a sudden, to encounter him.

A Reason made where there is no contradiction

Rather by Supposition, than by Experience.

Not small Work to entrench all the landing Places of England round.

or Swords, or Targets, do on them before they shall have time to unite their Forces.

A strong
Imagination
upon a weak
Supposition.

No Impe-
diment but
that our Na-
vy should im-
peach them
upon all Af-
fairs.

An Invador
will both
forecast and
prevent those
Dangers.

You grant
him after-
wards Victu-
als enough, if
he can land,
you say he
shall find
Houses and
Barns full.

Again, After the Remnant shall land, if they be not all drowned, slain, or repelled in, or before, their landing; how easy a matter shall it be for a few Launces, joined with the Weapons aforesaid, to put such a confused, dispersed, scattered Sea-beaten company to the Sword, before they shall ever be able to advance Standard; or put themselves in order of Battle; Beside all this, if his Majesty's Forces by Sea should not in time be assembled of such Strength as to be able to give them Battle, yet any mean Force (as sailing their Ships while their Men are in landing) cannot but greatly annoy them, if not utterly defeat them.

Also in most Places, if (except the Enemy bring his Tide-nistle with him) he cannot land, and then if part land, and any mean Resistance made to give impediment to the rest, till the Tide pass, their divided Forces may more easily be defeated.

Again, It is no small time that is requisite to land an Army, with Horfe, Carriage, Ordnance, Munition and Victuals, without which an Invador shall never be able to prevail; and then if any mean Resistance be made at the landing, it much prolongeth the same time, so as any Storm happening, the Winds, Tide, Shelves, Rocks, Bars, and Seas fight for us wholly in our Favour, and to the Ruin of our Enemy, and therefore I utterly disallow that Opinion to give the Enemy leave quietly to land, and they by Device to temporize afterwards.

Further,

Further, If such a Resolution should by the Prince and State be taken, that the invading Enemy should be suffered to land quietly, to spoil and burh at his Pleasure, and the inward Forces of the County not permitted, even at the first landing, to come to their Rescue; I would cause, no doubt, the Inhabitants of the Coasts to abandon their Towns, and leave the Frontiers desolate, which the wise Kings, and grave Counsellors of this Land have ever sought to make populous; by granting many Privileges and Munities to allure the Inhabitants on the Frontiers.

But touching driving, or carrying off Victuals, and leaving the Country waste; thereby to furnish our landed Enemy; it is a thing more easily wished then performed. I confess in *Ireland*, where most of their Substance consisteth of Kine, it is easily done. But in this rich and wealthy Country of *England*, it is not possible but that the Enemy (if he be once landed with all his Force) shall find Houses full of Provision, and Barns full of all kind of Forage and Corn, all the Country over; unless our Prince should command all to be wasted by Fire, which President we see seldom or never put in use; neither in these late Wars in *France* and *Flanders*, nor in any former Invasion that we read of, for it would make the Prince odious, and alienate extremely the Subjects Minds; and therefore not to be used, but upon great extremity, when all other Means fail; and here in *England*, above all other Countries, it may worst be done; for our Towns are poor, weak, and

It behoveth an Invador to be as wary of burning and spoiling as yourself, lest he make himself odious to his own Party.

No great Difficulty, though not so easily done as wished.

This is where the Prince is a Tyrant, otherwise he shall be obeyed in all things that tend to preserve the Country.

unprovided, and unfortified; the Country full of habitation, populous, rich, and abundance of all Commodities; in the Low Countries, (by reason of their great Force of strong, well fortified Towns) they might much more easily drive and carry to their Cities at hand all Victuals and Forrage, &c. and yet when the last great Army of the States, and *Don John* were in the Field, notwithstanding all the *Boors* and Country People were fled and retired to the next walled Town, and had Knowledge long before of the approaching of the Armies, yet were they not able to see to drive and carry away their Victuals and Forrage, but that the Enemy found Barns full in every Place, and in such sort, as we never were forced at any time to forrage four Miles from our Camp; so difficult, or rather impossible, a thing it is to carry away our Victuals or Forrage, or to leave the Enemy a waste Country.

But if here in *England*, we should drive or carry away our Victuals or Forrage to the next walled Town, the Enemy, being quietly landed with all his Munition, should have his chief Desire, knowing not only how weak and how unfortified our Towns are, but also how unprovided of all Necessities to abide a Siege of Fortification on the sudden could be made; wherefore I would wish all provident means used, to give the Enemy all possible Annoyance before and at the landing, and by no means to suffer him to land quietly, or to trust to that temporizing Course, which is rather to be practised when all other means fail, than

Here he speaketh as if the Enemy by his landing, were strait Master of the Field, and no Place left us but walled Towns to guard our Castle and Victuals.

By Reason and Presidents it is proved you cannot prevent an Invador's landing.

to be relied upon at the beginning. I grant it perilous for a defendant Prince to hazard his Crown on a Battle, and more dangerous for Men untrained to encounter expert disciplin'd Soldiers, and most perilous to us, that have no strong Town to make head, if we lose the Battle. And therefore it is no part of my meaning to wish our Prince to give any invading Enemy Battle, with all our Forces, how well prepared and ordered soever we be; but my meaning is to have such Provision in every Shire as we may be able readily, on a sudden, to give the Enemy all Annoyance possible, before and at their landing, whilst the inward Forces of our Country may the better assemble and put themselves in military Order, to protect after as shall be found most convenient.

Too late to
to shut the
Stable when
the Steed is
stolen.

A Reply to the Reasons aforesaid

Now to come to the Question, and Matter propounded, Whether it be better to fight with an Enemy at his landing, or to defer Battle, I will first distinguish between an Enemy Invador, whom we will presuppose would be Conqueror, to alter and change the State, and an Enemy Borderer, who either, to procure a new Quarrel, or to revenge an old Wrong, may support some small Company by Shipping; or, dwelling upon the Main, may make Incursion into the Country, only to burn and spoil some part thereof; such an Enemy may be fought withal at his first appearance, or landing, because there is means and likelihood to repulse

A Distinction
between
twixt an Enemy
Invador,
and an Enemy
Borderer.

These are
a forlorn
Hope as the
Germans term
them.

As the Earl
of Warwick
did out of
Normandy in
Edward the
IVth's time.

repulse him again with the only aid and strength of the Frontier Forces, as hath been alledged in my former Treatise, viz. That if the Enemy should intend but to land and burn some Houses or Village near unto the Sea Coast, for the Prevention thereof, as much as may be, it were good to appoint only those that dwell within two or three Miles of the Sea Side to repair thither to make Resistance, and for their Succour, to appoint the Horsemen to draw down to the Plains next adjoining, who may also give them Stop from stragling far into the Country, and though you should receive a Foil there, 'tis no Danger, for his Intent is not to dwell and tarry by it; but for an Invador, as there is a difference of his Intention and Force, so must you make also a difference in the Encounter and Prevention accordingly; who if he cannot be defeated by our Navy (which I have always preferred for the first Tryal, although it be hardly gathered to the contrary against me) which either, I say, might, by contrary Winds, or other Accidents, happen to miss each other, and so the Enemy come undiscovered upon our Coasts; or otherwise might land in despite of our Shipping; then my Opinion was to restrain those Countries, disorderly running down to the Sea Coasts, as a thing very dangerous, being not able to withstand their Landing first, because it was said such an Enemy would land more Men in three Hours, than would be meet in reason for you to fight withal in three Days: Such a while will it be before the Country can come down to the Sea Side,

Side, as hath been seen by many false Alarms given to the Country for Trial of the Readiness thereof; next, because it is impossible so to man the Sea Coasts round, as that an Enemy (meaning but to land and burn only) may suddenly weigh Anchor and sail further in few Hours, than your Army, that you have provided in a Readiness, can march well in two Days. As for Example, the *French* made shew in King *Henry* the VIIIth's Days, as though they would land in the Isle of *Wight*, or *Portsmouth*, and finding the Country drawn down thither, by means of the King's being there, hoisted Sails landed and burnt at *Bright-helmsted* in *Sussex*, and in the Downs in *Kent*, and after returned and landed in the Isle of *Wight*. Then seeing the Enemies Remove from Place to Place is so speedy, and his Landing so uncertain, and the Knowledge thereof beforehand impossible, I would feign know how strong a Resistance the Country can be able to make, upon a sudden, against an Invador that would have a thousand or two more instantly; or rather, which hath embarked his Men in Vessels of so small Draught, as Men may leap on Shore out of them.

How your
prepar'd Forces
may be
prevented.

The Gentleman meaning to sail safely betwixt the two Rocks of *Scilla* and *Charibdis* imagineth he goeth clear; which as he striketh upon both, who seemeth to dislike of giving of Battle, would have the Country drawn down to make Resistance and impeach their landing; I would thereupon ask this Question, if the Men you send down be once in fight, whether you think

it

A Military Discourse, &c.

it not requisite to second them? If you second them, what do you then else but engage yourself to Battle? If you will not second them, then do you most barbarously expose your Men to Slaughter and Butchery. How great a Discouragement that would be to your People, and what Inconvenience might follow, I leave it to your Judgment; but from whence proceedeth this Opinion of the Necessity or Inconvenience of a rash and sudden Encounter with an Enemy at his landing? but from an excessive Fear and Doubtfulness conceived beforehand, that all the Realm should be in hazard to be lost, if the Enemy were but once suffered to land and have firm Footing, which Imagination groweth for want of skill in Marshal Actions; and therefore we seek to prevent that by a desperate and disorderly Fight, which we might more safely remedy, by a defensive and less dangerous Course, as may appear by the Examples of a weak Ship and a battered Town, which both by suffering themselves to be entered and assaulted, the one by her close Fighting, and the other by new Retrenchments, do give the entered Enemy the greater Foil, even then when they think themselves possessed of all; besides, a King that in his own Country may be supplied with infinite Numbers of Pyoniers, who in few Hours may rear death Works to tripple his Force against an Invador (as is well known to him that is a Soldier) should be utterly deprived of that singular Benefit by that most barbarous Custom heretofore used, and yet maintained;

I mean

I mean of the disorderly running down to the Sea Side, to give an invading Enemy battle at his first landing.

What reason has *Spain* to attempt the Conquest and Subversion of this Realm, but that they presumed, we would assuredly, upon our old Custom of giving them battle at their landing, which if we should do, there would be greater likelihood, first that we should lose the same, and next having lost the battle, I fear me, that the Subversion of this famous Island would ensue; for an aspiring King, that hath a great Faction within a Country, may presume beforehand to carry the same; if he be assured that the People thereof will give him battle at his first landing.

Therefore if you will avoid an Invasion, and the danger of a Conquest, let it be known to the World, that you find your Error in the same, and that you will embrace those Advantages that Time, and the Benefit of your Country, doth afford you; and you shall henceforth undoubtedly avoid the trouble of the first, and be free from the Danger of the last: We read that *Scanderbagge* (nevertheless that he expected the Invasion of so puissant an Enemy as was the *Turk*) thought it not good to levy any great Army of Force to give him battle, but only certain select Bands of light Horse, and Footmen lightly armed, and causing all the People of the Frontiers to withdraw themselves, their Cattle, Corn, and Substance, into the strong and fortified Places of the Country, did with those select Bands force the Enemy on the Frontiers, by keeping of Streights

The only Hope of an Invador is to prevail by battle.

Scanderbagge against the *Turk*.

and Passages, making sudden Attempts in the Night, and such other times, as by Spial, he found the Enemy careless, and so with a few People by Time, Famine, and Expences, he wearied the Enemy and caused him to retire, that otherwise in battle might have gotten the Victory, and so in short time commanded the whole Country; wherefore I would not wish any Prince to adventure his Kingdom that way, unless he be weary of the same; battle being the only thing for an Invader to seek, and on the contrary, for the Defender to avoid and shun, for the one doth hazard but his People, and hath a Lot to win a Kingdom, and the other in losing of the battle, endangereth his Crown.

The Gentleman disalloweth of a confused disorderly running down to the Sea Side, and yet would fight with them presently at their landing; which is a thing impossible, for if you take time to put Men in order (which you must of necessity do, by reason of the slack Assembly) then will the Enemy land in the mean while, and frustrate your Purpose, unless you were made acquainted long beforehand, when and where he intendeth to land, and where you might make your supposed Trenches, you write of to lodge your Men in. There be some also that conceive a great Advantage of the Enemies weak coming from the Sea, and of their landing out of Boats disorderly, which when it shall happen to come in Trial, it will easily appear how far they are deceived in both; for who knoweth not that even all Men coming near the Shore, and

and smelling Land, become well and found again of their Sea Sicknes; also what numbers of Men will be landed at one instant in Boats, Gallies, or other Vessels of small Draught, and that safe enough; as those that have been imployed in like Accounts can testify. And as touching Rocks, Shelves, contrary Winds, &c. which is said, may fight for us, we must not build upon such Uncertainties, for an Enemy will beforehand so set down, and lay his Plot, where he will make his Descent, as that none of all those Accidents shall give any Impediment to the same. What other Advantage our Countrymen have made, either of their Courage, or of the Goodness of the Cause, without Knowledge, and Order how to dispose thereof, will rather be an occasion of their Overthrow, than means of the Victory; but especially a few to fight against many, disordered against ordered, Countrymen against experienced Soldiers; the odds that the Enemy hath of you therein, will be much greater than your imagined Advantages. And albeit that I confess our Countrymen have a shew of Desire to fight, (as having natural helps of Strength, Courage, and Ability of Body, exceeding generally any other Nation) yet can it not be denied, but that in the Artificial we must needs be defective, for want of Use and Practice; and therefore not to be suffered to run down to the Sea Side, in that confused and accustomed manner, unless it might be done with a competent number of choise Men, conducted by a skilful Leader, that knoweth how to make

Strength and
Courage a-
vail most, be-
ing joined
with Skill and
Order to dis-
pose of them.

his Fight upon the best Advantage, and to retire them again orderly, to their least Hurt and Discouragement; otherwise I do altogether disallow of that general Repair to the Sea Side; but rather to make your Assemblies five or six Miles distant, with all your Foot Forces, and to attend them in the Plains with your Horsemen, as hath been alledged before, with divers other reasons for the same, for whatsoever Men resolve with themselves beforehand, and what Minds soever they may seem to put on, when they shall be driven to make their way through the Vollies of Shot, having never been acquainted with that Game before, it may either make them to pinch, through the Strangeness thereof, or at least (having tasted of that same, and finding it better) may spread Rumours to discourage a whole Army; for often times the Fame and Lenity of a Repulse, maketh others as fearful that but hear of it, as those that have been in the Action, and born the Blows themselves; how unlikely then it is, that you should profit yourselves by that means, or impeach your Enemy, may easily appear.

But let us come to Examples, for it is not sufficient to say by Experience of former Invasion, &c. not alledging any; Where can it be remembred, that a strong Enemy, offering to land, hath been prevented by the Frontier Forces? I think

The Priest
of St. Mar-
garet's with
his Bow and
Arrows.

few or none who be avouched, unless a President of the Priest of St. Margaret's near Dover, shall be admitted for one, of whom the old *Fletchers* retain a Memorial,

rial, in honour of their Bows; who is said, that with his Bow, and Sheaf of Arrows, to have kept down the *Frenchmen* that offered to land in a narrow Passage up the Cliffs near *Dover*, where they found a Gate barred and locked to stop the same, and he standing over them on the top of a Cliff, played a tall Bowman's part, when as in these Days, the *French* had not any Shot, but some few Cross-Bows that would not deliver a Quarry half way up the Cliff at him; and so it was given out, that he kept them down till the Country was come down to the Sea Side, to repel them back to their Boats, or rather, I suppose, myself knowing the Place, when they saw that the Gate was so fast as they could not suddenly break it open, they returned before their coming, but yet I must needs confess the Bow bare the Bell, before the Devil, I suppose, sent the Harquebuz and Musket out of Hell.

For fresh
Water as it is
supposed.

But here lest I be mistaken, though I prefer the Force of the Harquebuz and Musket far before the Bow, yet do I not disallow of the Bow, but rather judge the same to be both a serviceable and warlike Weapon, as well in Town as in Field; and although it be not greater pertinent to this Question, yet for that it is convenient to be known and considered; in regard of these Times, and this present Occasion, I will by the way shew you briefly how, and wherein you may, as I judge, make good use of this Weapon: First in the Field against Horsemen, though it be shot at the highest random, only with the weight of the Fall it galleth both Horse and Man, and though

The Use
of the Bow,
and how you
may take Ser-
vice by it.

though the Wound be not mortal, yet both Horse and Man are thereby made unerviceable then and long after, if so be they escape Death. Secondly, in Rainy Weather, and when Men come near together, it is a very good Weapon. Thirdly, in the the Night, it is both a ready and secret Shot, and doth not discover itself, as doth the Harquebuze, both with his Fire and Blow, and the use of it is good, when it be in forcing the Enemies Trenches, in sallying out of Town, or otherwise. Fourthly, at an Assault, when all the Defence in a Town are taken away, you deliver your Arrows over the Wall, and Men are galled, both under Wall and Rampires, with its Fall only. The like use have we also of them out of the Town, when an Assault is given, in delivering them into the Enemies Trenches, and among Men, at their approach to an Assault, though they be shot over the Wall by chance. Fifthly, to shoot Arrows with Wild-fire, to burn a Gate or Drawbridge, to fire thatched or shingled Houses. In *France*, when we were before *Paris*, and divers other Towns that we besieged, Bows would have stood us in good stead, and I did then wish that we had brought some Bowmen over with us; surely we have no reason to give over the Bow, as we have done, for I hold that the worst Bowman that can draw but his Bow, to be far better than a bad Fire-shot; and as we do generally sort our Weapons, we do appoint more Fire-shot, than ten times so much Powder as we have, would serve them to burn, if there were cause to use them; wherefore
I could

I could wish we make a special Choice of our Harquebuzers and Musketeers; and the rest to be Bowmen, such as they are. It is great pity that upon some few Men's private Fancies, we do alter and change Arms and Weapons as we do, putting the Country to great Charge therewith, and oftentimes their Furniture spoiled and marr'd thereby; for one Man upon view of the Country's Furniture, will break all the Stocks of their Pieces, and cause them to make crooked. Another Man cometh after, and will break break the crooked, and force them to make strait Stocks again. Then cometh the third, and will make them to cut the Barrels of their Pieces shorter, and bore them bigger. And another cometh with a Smith's Sledge, and he will both break the Pieces, and batter Armors, and will have all Men furnished according to his Fancy. It is to be wished, that there should not be any suffered to make an alteration of Arms and Weapons of himself, but rather the same to be done by an Order established for the same, and by those that are of Judgment, and in Authority.

I must not here forget to remember you how hard a matter it is to propound an Innovation or Change, though it be of very dangerous Usages and Customs, unless the same be either done or seconded by some great Person, at whom the Ignorant and Barbarous dare not mock and scoff; myself can remember, when upon the firing off the Beacons, whereby an Alarm was given, the Country People forthwith ran down to the Sea Side, some with Clubs, some with Pikes,

Some that have been Muster Masters in the Shire to shew a Singularity.

Old Customs hardly broken, tho' they be dangerous.

Pikes, Staves, and Pitchforks, all unarmed; and they that were best armed were with a Bill, a Bow, and a Sheaf of Arrows; no Captain or Commander appointed to direct, lead, or order them; it may be, some discreet Man above the rest, would throw some rusty, Almanics, Revels, Jacks, and Skulls into a Cart, to be carried after them, the Country so inflamed with Heat and Fury, as they would kill and slay all before they came near them; which Custom, and frivolous running down to the Sea Side to repel the Enemy; is yet maintained and allowed, adding how dangerous a matter it were by tarrying to arm and put them in order, whereby this Heat and Fury might wax cold; which is not, say they, so easily inflamed again. But if Men might, without Danger, see a Trial thereof, and how a few orderly Soldiers would chase and pursue great numbers of those furious inflamed savage Flock and Herd; such Men would afterwards be very respective to give Allowance to any such dangerous Customs and Usages.

Examples
and Precedents
of landing.

But now touching landing, let us see what may be conceived out of the former Experience, did not the ³ Earl of *Warwick*, notwithstanding the Duke of *Burgundy's* great and puissant Navy, which he had prepared to join with *Edward* the IVth, for the impeaching the Earl's landing from out of *France*, and the Fleet being before the Haven in *Normandy*, out of which

^{*}The Earl of *Warwick* landed in *England*, and drove out *Edward* the IVth.

the Earl must come; the Duke having also forewarned the King, into what Part or Port of *England* the Earl meant to make his Descent, whereby in all likelihood he was, or might have provided sufficiently to withstand the same, yet fell it out so, that the Earl of *Warwick* escaped their Fleet, landed in *England*, and drove the King to fly for Succour into the *Low Countries*, and enlarged *Henry* the VIth, and set him in his former Estate; after this, Did not *Edward* the IVth (with some small aid from the Duke of *Burgundy* given him, and that under hand, both of Men, and Money) *Edward* the IVth re-land- ed in *England* and deposed *Henry* the VIth. transport himself into *England* again, and in battle shew that the Earl of *Warwick*, and his Adherents, deposed *Henry* the VIth, resuming again unto himself the Kingdom of *England*? Have not the Kings of *England* many times entred *France* and *Scotland* by Navy, during the time of Wars betwixt them? and to recollect some later Examples within our own memory; Did not *Queen Mary* land 5000 Men in *Britain*, (one of the most popular Parts of all *France*) *Queen Mary* landed 5000 Men in *Britain* & burnt *Conguet*. and there sacked and burnt *Conguet* and other Places, our Men remaining on Shore two days and a night, burning and spoiling, and were not, or rather would not be, resisted upon the sudden? Have not small Forces likewise of our *Englishmen*, now in her Majesty's time, landed in the *Indies* *The English* landed in the *Indies*. at sundry times, sacked and ransomed their Towns, brought away their Munition, with other great Spoils and Riches, and yet at their landing were not withstood? and did not our Army also land in *Spain* and

E

Por-

The *English*
in *Spain* and
Portugal.

The *Spanish*
Forces in
Portugal.

The *French*
in the *Terceras*.

The *Spanish*
re-landed
there.

Portugal, at sundry times, and in sundry places; the having knowledge long time before of their coming, whereby the Country was, or might have been, in that readines as themselves would have desired, and yet, by a temporizing course, used against them, they were driven to retire, both feeble and broken; whereas if they had been fought withal at their landing, and had won the Field, there had been great hope they might have prevailed in their Enterprize; Did not the *Spanish* Forces also land in *Portugal*, and the other Army by land, under the Conduct of the Duke of *Alva*, by winning the battle, win the Kingdom withal, and drove the King quite out of his Country? Did not the *French* Forces likewise land in the *Terceras*, in despite of the Country? and did not the *Spanish* Forces after re-land, stay, and drive them all out again? Infinite are the Presidents of landing, and a rare matter to time any example of an Army coming to invade, to be prevented of landing, by the Country's Fury, and running down to the Sea Side; and what Soldier, or Man of War, would not undertake to land, even a few Men in comparison of a Royal Army, in any Prince's Realms and Dominions, spoil and burn at his Pleasure, until such time as they had assembled greater Forces than the Inhabitants of the Coasts next adjoining, whatsoever then a Man cannot resist, he must give way to, reason and experience doth plainly prove that it cannot be withstood, but that a forcible Enemy will land; therefore the best Remedy will be to give him way, and withal to re-

remember to do all things like wise Men and Soldiers as hath been said already, by drawing your Cattle and Provision, &c. at your Backs, lest you should otherwise relieve and nourish them, whom your intention and purpose is to starve and destroy.

Did not the Duke of *Alva* defeat the Prince of *Orange's* great Army, by forbearing to fight with him; and leaving him a waste Country to walk and weary himself in? Did not the Constable of *France* defeat the Emperor's Attempt upon *Province*, by this only temporizing course? Did not he burn the Mills, destroy the Ovens, spoil the Fruit, &c. himself retiring to *Avignon*, there to join with his Forces, after he had provided for the Frontier Towns, leaving nothing but a waste Country for his Enemy to spend themselves in? whereby he drove the Emperor, in the end, to make a most dishonourable Retreat. Monsieur de *Lun-gey* doth alledge that Example of the Constable of *France*, approving greatly the device and policy therein; notwithstanding there were divers who did not stick to blame him, for that he did not rather strive to stop the Enemy's Passage through the Mountains; which they supposed he might have done very easily, and with a few Men; but he, foreseeing the mischief that might grow by a small foil, or loss received at the first, thought it the safest way to prevent all dangers, by temporizing until his Forces were assembled in full strength, and his Enemy weakened; saying, moreover, that it is a great point of wisdom for a Prince or Captain-General to defeat the

The Duke of *Alva* against the Prince of *Orange*.

The Constable of *France* against the Emperor.

coming to battle, when the Enemies are entered into his Country; for, saith he, if the battle should be lost through the encountering of them, the Country would also be in hazard to be lost. And this may appear by divers examples:

The King of Hungary against the Turk.

William the Conqueror, and Henry VII, obtained the Crown of England by Battle.

The Duke of Burgundy won the Country of Liege by Battle.

First, the King of Hungary (being assailed by the Turk, in the Year 1562) thought it better to hazard the battle, and to fight with the Turk at his arrival, than to forbear and stand upon his guard, which was the cause that he himself was slain, and a great part of his Kingdom lost. And did not William the Conqueror, and King Henry the VIIth, become King of England, by reason the Defendant gave them battle at their landing, and lost the same.

But some may here object unto me, that the parties and factions they had within the land were cause thereof. And doth any Man think that a Foreign Prince is so void of Judgment, as that he thinks to prevail by way of Conquest without a Party? Did not the Duke of Burgundy get the Country of Liege, by reason of one battle he won against the people thereof? Philip de Comines saith, that a Man ought greatly to fear to hazard his estate on a battle, when he may otherwise avoid the same. For, saith he, of a small number of People lost, there followeth a great change to him that loseth them; not so much by the fear they conceive of the Enemy, as in the little estimation they will have of their Men afterward, being ready still to enter into Mutinies, demanding things more boldly than they were wont; alledging

ing further, that one Crown before, will do more with them than three will do after; whoſoever will read the whole Diſcourſe of the Actions of *Lewis* the XIth King of *France* (who was both a very wiſe and valiant Prince) ſhall find, that after the great Encounter between him and Count *Charles*, the Duke of *Burgonie's* Son, at *Montlerre*, notwithstanding that the Conflict went ſo indifferent, as neither ſide knew, almoſt by the ſpace of three or four hours after, who had the Victory; ſo ſoon as each part had relieved their broken Troops, having good means ſo to do, by reaſon of a great ditch, and a long hedge that was between their two Armies, where the Fight firſt begun; altho' the King's Power remained ſtill greater, by reaſon of ſo many Princes, as have aſſembled together, yet then, and ever after, he determined no more to venture ſo great a Kingdom as *France* was, upon the uncertain event of battle, and therefore the night following, he diſlodged and retired to *Corckell*, after which time he carried on all his Wars with ſuch a temporizing courſe, as thereby he wearied his Enemies, and became a mighty Prince, making his Army ſo great, as his Adverſaries, at no time after, dare attempt to give him battle. Although *Philip de Comines* doth write, that our Nation hath been wonderful fortunate in battle, and are much addicted thereunto, yet doth he more allow of the politick and wiſe temporizing of *Lewis* the French King, in forbearing to fight with *Edward* the IVth when he entred *France*, proffering him battle near *Amyeus*. The King conſidering how dangerous an adventure it was to his State,

Lewis the XIth againſt *Charles* the Duke of *Burgondy's* Son.

Lewis againſt *Edward* the IVth.

if it should not succeed well with him, looking also back to the great thralldom and subjection that his Predecessors had brought the Kingdom of *France* into, under the *English* Nation, by such like rash acceptance of battle, he determined to temporize, though it were to his charge, thereby to weaken the King of *England*, the Winter season drawing then on; in the mean time, sending great Presents to those that were near about the King, and Victuals of free Gifts to this Army, condescending also to pay a yearly Sum of 30000 Crowns into the Tower of *London*, thereby to hasten the Peace; and to get our Nation to return; after all was concluded, and the King returned home, one of the King of *England*'s Men being with *Philip de Commines* in discourse, he told him that he had been at the winning of nine battles; and of how many, said *Philip*, have you been at the loosing? only of one, said he, and that was at the last forbearance of my Men to fight with yours at *Amiens*, whereby we have gotten more shame unto ourselves, than honour by the first nine; when *Lewis* the King heard of this Speech, he said, this is a shrewd Boy, and sent for him to dine with him, and after gave him 1000 Crowns with other great promises, to the intent he should be a means to entertain the Peace begun between the two Kings; what Success had the *French* in the battles at *Poytries* and *Cressy*, who, although they were in number far greater than the *English*, and in the heart of their own Country, yet tasted they what bitter effects followeth

The Battle
of *Poytries*
and *Cressy*.

a lost Field ; and we, by other such manifold Examples, might be warned not to commit the good estate of a Realm to so fickle and dangerous a tryal, as is the uncertain sway of a battle ; and now lately, Did not our *English* Navy defeat the great *Spanish* Fleet by this temporizing course ? which had not been so easy, as it was thought, to have been performed by main Force in boarding them at the first ; yet some would have this temporizing course not to be used at the beginning, but when all other means fail ; and then, say I, it will be too late to temporize, when you have fought and received the foil. Infinite are the examples to confirm these temporizing courses, by means whereof, great and strong Armies have, in short time, been dissolved and come to nothing ; as namely, the great Army assembled at the Hymenant in *Brabant* ; the *Germans* sundry times in *France*, and now lately the Duke of *Parma's* Army in *France*, when he came to the relief of *Paris* in the Year 1590. Lastly, let me, the better to remove this old impression of rash encountering of an Enemy Invador, remember you of the unadvised encounter of the Duke of *Burgundy*, who besieged a certain Town in *Savoy* called *Grauson*, with a very great Army, to the relief thereof came certain *Switzers*, though not in great numbers ; the Duke, hearing of their approach, sent some Forces to give them all annoyance possible, and also to prevent their entry and descent into the Country, (for that the passage, where they should enter, was through a very narrow Strait, betwixt certain Mountains)

The *Spanish* Fleet defeated by the *English* Navy.

Hymenant Leaguer, the *Germans* and the Duke of *Parma's* Army in *France*.

The miserable fall of the Duke of *Burgundy*.

Mountains) and himself followed, with some greater Forces to second them; and this was done by the Duke, contrary to the advice of his Counsel, who persuaded him rather to attend their coming, with all his Forces, in the Place, where they were both by nature of the Fight, and also by Art, very strongly encamped, and where, in all seasons, he could have sustained no danger. To make it short, the Duke's Van-guard were not able to withstand the *Switzers* entry; but the Duke's Rear-guard seeing this supposing they had fled, began also to fly. In fine, his whole Force retired toward the Camp, and although some behaved themselves very well in this retreat, yet when they came into the Camp, they dar'd not defend it, but all betook themselves to Flight, leaving their rich and pompous Camp, with their Artilleries to the spoil of the poor *Switzers*, who slew very few of his People, for want of Horsemen to follow the Chase; the Duke, who the day before, was hoisted up to the Sky in pride, through the seeking to him of so many great States and Princes, that desired to allie and confederate themselves with him, in league and friendship; presently, after the loss of this battle, he found a great alteration and change, for there fell from him four sorts of People, who became his Enemies. The Carriage of the Duke was still so great, that he would not thus give over, but would try a second battle at *Morat*. Upon the loss thereof, divers others of his Allies fell from him also, and lastly, after the battle of *Nauscy*, where he

himself

himself was slain; a great part both of his Most dangerous to give a
own proper Dominions, and of *Burgundy* it- second Battle
self, fell from his House also: Thus you till you have
may see what a long and evil tail a lost recovered
battle hath, as *Lewis* the *French* King was new Courage,
wont to say, if you desire examples of and forgotten
greater Antiquity, I will refer you to the former Fears.
reading of the *Roman* Histories; but be-
cause my meaning is to be brief, I will
here remember you only of one; namely,
of *Cæsar* himself, who never would attain
to the sole Government of *Rome* until *Pom-
pey* (opposing himself against it, on the be-
half of the State and Senate of *Rome*) gave
him battle and lost it; after which he was
driven to fly into *Egypt*, where *Ptolemy* the
King sent his Head unto *Cæsar*, whereby
there was none left able to withstand him;
by the which he got not only the absolute
Government for himself, but also brought
and redeemed the free Estate of *Rome* to a
Monarchy.

But if the Defendant chance to win the The Moors a-
battle, then indeed he removeth the cause, gainst the K.
and endeth the danger, as the *Moors* did of France.
against the King of *Portugal*, who landed
without any resistance, but the Defendants
finding themselves the stronger, as well in
Foot as in Horse, thought it no danger to
give battle, which grew by temporizing
until their Power was come together, for it
is most certain, that as long as you abstain
from coming to fight, the Enemy shall al-
ways be held in doubt of winning, and you
shall be in no hazard of losing the Coun-
try; and your Malecontents, and evil dispos-
ed Persons, will be kept from revolt, who
F no

no doubt will see a battle fought before they will shew themselves open Enemies, yea, whatsoever they have promised before-hand, as the *Portugals* did to *Don Antony*, and performed it not; by which delatary means of proceeding, you may be at choice, either to accept or refuse the battle, as shall be most for your advantage, when by time you have made yourselves strong, and your Enemies weak. And this defensive War, and these temporizing Courses, we see that all Princes, and Men of War that are, or have been of late, of Judgment, do imitate and follow: As whosoever will look into the *Duke of Parma's* Actions, shall seldom see that ever he came to fight a set battle but when all other means did fail to accomplish that which he intended. And no less noble and glorious is that Victory holden, which is obtained by Counsels, De vice, and Policy, than that which is won by the Sword, Violence, and Blood.

There be many that are greater readers of the Wars, than practitioners of the same, who altogether do disallow of ours in these days; and would have the *Roman* Orders in our Armies, renewed, not only in fortifying Men with armour and weapon, but also in the manner of their marching, encamping, embattling and fighting; inferring thereupon, if we became in all respects the like Soldiers, we should also become like Conquerors as they were; and in regard thereof, highly blame and reprove our Generals, for neglecting to imitate their Orders, and restore them again to practice; which reading Warriors, and Book military Men

Men do not weigh the great charge that time hath made, and experience found out in martial Affairs; in such sort, as if it were possible to renew the same again, yet should it not now work the like effect against us, that it did then against some of those, against whom they then warred; neither did it then with such speed, or in such certain and forcible sort, against *Hanibal* and the *Carthaginians*, or any other that were a warlike Nation; although it cannot be denied, but that the Government and Discipline, they wrote of, was very good, and well deserved amongst them, and better than ours is now amongst us. One great Cause I suppose was, for that they made better Payments in those days than they do now, whereby Vice was in their Army very severely punished, and Virtue and Prowess most bountifully rewarded, and when Men returned home, such as had deserved well, were regarded and rewarded for their Service, or else remained still in pensionary Pay enrolled, and the Exercise of Arms by that means continued: For where Payment and Reward cease, their Discipline and good Order cease also. For example, I refer you to the *French Wars*, and their Discipline now used, and compare it with that which hath been hertofore; some there be yet living, that have seen and known both, and may say there is a great Change: But let it be rightly examined, how those *Romans* became so famous in Overthrows and Conquests, and you will find that it was partly because they warred against those bar-

barous Nations, who were altogether void of Discipline, Order, and the right use of Weapons, and partly for that, this military Art was not grown to that general Knowledge and Perfection that it is now; wherein Men were ignorant how to make a defensive War, and to use the benefit of these temporizing Courses; for if great Armies would have prevailed against these late practised Policies, we should not have seen, as we have, in our days, very great Armies, and well ordered, yet dissolved and broken, without striking a stroke. And as touching the Leaders and Captains, I do not think but that there are, and have been many of late, and some in our time, which generally for Souldier-like judgment and knowledge, in making a War offensive and defensive, might be compared with any of those *Roman* Captains that were then, namely, *Lewis* the XIth, and *Charles* his Son the Emperor, the Duke of *Alva*, the Prince of *Orange*, the late Constable of *France*, and the Duke of *Parma*, who have all performed as notable Enterprises (considering the People and Nation against whom they warr'd) as any that have been before them. And the self-same cause that made the *Romans* so famous and admirable in prevailing with small numbers against huge Armies, hath made, or might make the *Spaniards* no less renowned against the *Turks* and the *Barbarians*; as also the King of *England*, in their Encounters against the *Irish* Nation; whosoever will look rightly into the Duke of *Parma's* Actions (especially the late Carriage of his Wars

Wars in *France*) shall find just cause, as well to admire him and his doings, effecting all matters that he came for, marching forward, and retiring backward at his pleasure; considering the great inequality of the numbers of the *French*, being then Masters of the Field, and in their own Country, back'd and seconded with all things needful; as also for that they are a Nation of as ancient and modern Exercise in Arms as the other. But to the intent it be not imputed altogether to the courage and magnanimity of our Enemies; and the cowardliness and pusillanimity of our Friends; and yet to speak truly of both, and to shew the Cause of the prevailing, I rather judge it to consist in the diversity of their Discipline, Order, Policy, and Government, the well and ill Fortune of their Weapons and People, the strong and orderly marching, and incamping of the one, who lodgeth within a Mile's compass; whereas the other, contrary to this, seldom lieth within twenty. What is the cause of all this? the truth is, the one hath means to make good Payments, which retaineth good Discipline; the other hath not, which bringeth all Disorder; the one imitating *Cæsar* with Foot, the other *Pompey* on Horse; the one contented to march on Foot, to drink Water, lie upon the Ground, and to fare hardly; the other must be mounted on Horseback, drink Wine, lie in Houses, and fare daintily; the one having in his Army few that command, and many that know how to obey; the other many that will command, and few that desire to obey; and

and lastly, then having good means to carry on an orderly War, in time, opportunity, and season; whereas the other, wanting the same, is driven to loose, scanning, and disorderly Proceeding? What will be the end and conclusion then of this say you? Forsooth, I fear me, (if some alteration, grow not in these Courses now pursued) the one will dwell in *Rome*, and triumph with *Cæsar*; when the other will be driven to fly into *Egypt*, and wait with *Pompey*, or otherwise to yield to his Enemy's Conditions. For remedy of this imminent Mischief, it were good to reform the error in time, with the Prince of *Orange*, who when he saw he could not prevail with huge Troops on Horseback, against the Duke of *Alva*, whose Forces consisted of Foot, he lighted, and by imitating him, he became so good a Schollar, as in short time he drove his Master out of the Country; for the Foot are the only pillars and upholders of an Army. Now here may be objected the examples of the *French*, who notwithstanding have heretofore maintained a long War against the King of *France*, in their own Country by Horse, which I grant feasible in so spacious a Country as *France* is, where hardly they could be angled or coop'd up, they might uphold themselves long through good Intelligence, and Spial, whereby to maintain a loose, scrambling, and trumtuary War, as heretofore a few Snapphams have done the like in *Germany*. And yet hath a small number of Foot, well sorted and appointed with Pikes, given convoy through them passing to any Place they list. The

Switzers

Switzers, whose poverty was such, through the bareness of their Country, as they could not mount themselves, took up and renewed the Pike again, by which they have withstood the Fury of the Cavalry of the French, who were not able to break into a poor distressed Battalion of theirs, after the Overthrow given at *Mountcouter*; but that the Duke of Guise was driven first to bring his Cannons, and by that means, forced them to throw down their Pikes, and yield themselves to his Mercy.

But to return to my former purpose again, I grant that, in some cases to defer and delay your Fight may be dangerous, in letting slip some notable Advantage, which is not my meaning to restrain you from; but only to counsel you in this case, not to join battle rashly and unadvisedly with your Enemies, the which (besides the danger incident to rash Attempts) doth cut you off from all Advantages and Supplies, that may be had by Time, Deliberation, and Counsels, for there is nothing whereby may be shewed more true Fortitude, than in this Action: For to fight, Courage doth naturally provoke; but to refrain upon good grounds, is to advise of Wisdom; and he that will fight upon every call and offer of the Enemy, shall be sure to do it to his own Disadvantage, and thereby shall shew that he hath no Experience of Wars, and is ignorant of his Charge and Mutabilities of Fortune; or, as I may say more aptly, knoweth not how to use his Fortune, yet, what is the common Voice of the Country? but let us run down and fight with

Not to temporize where-
by you loose
any Advantage.

Whereupon
Courage and
Resolution do
grow.

with them; shall we suffer them to land and spoil our Country? with Heat and Fury, as it riseth suddenly, so may it happen to be cooled quickly again. But that which increaseth and confirmeth Courage best, and maketh Men resolute and constant indeed, is, when they shall see themselves accompanied with numbers able to resist, instructed with Knowledge, how to use their Weapons, and fortified with Order, to be able to withstand and repel an Enemy. This it is which will make even a Coward valliant; for as one saith, the fierce and disordered Men are much weaker than the fearful and ordered; for that Order expelleth fear from Men, and disorder abateth Fierceness; so then it is not Fury that prevaleth in War, but good Discipline and Order.

And here by the way, to answer some common Objections that Men make, saying, they shall fight coldly when their Houses are suffered to be burnt, or their Goods spoiled by the Enemy; and thereby would induce a necessity of fighting at the landing, and before they have received any such cooling Care: I think this opinion contrary to Reason and Courage, for every Man being naturally revengeful even of the least wrong that can be done, or suffered amongst ourselves, it were very strange they should not wreak this extream Injury of a common Enemy, with all possible Might and Power, and wherein the cause of Religion, Country, and Liberty are also in question; but the chief scope of my first Book, was but to perswade you to restrain

strain the violent and disorderly running down of the Country to the Sea side to fight, and give battle to the Enemy at his landing, after the old Custom; wherein was shewed, the danger and inconvenience that might follow; which latter part, I mean of giving battle, is also granted by the Gentleman himself; upon the Conclusion of his own reason, in these words, I grant it perilous, saith he, for a Defendant Prince to hazard his Crown on a battle, and more dangerous for Men untrained, to encounter expert disciplined Soldiers, and most perilous to us that have no strong Towns to give the Enemy stop, and to make head if we lose the battle. And therefore it is no part of my meaning to wish our Prince to give any invading Enemy battle, how well prepared and ordered soever we be, so that if he would have granted but to stay the running down to the Sea Side, (which cannot be but disorderly, confused, and dangerous) then had he granted all that is desired.

And here by the way, (occasion being offered) to speak somewhat of strong Towns; some there be of that opinion, that a Country well peopled, and that hath few or no strong Towns, is in less danger of conquest, than that Realm that hath many; because, say they, an Enemy cannot any way nestle himself, but that you may at all times force him to battle at your pleasure. To that may be answered, that a battle being the thing an Invador is desirous of, and which a Defendant ought to shun; your strong Towns are in that case

most available for the Defendant Prince in his own Country against an Invador, because he may only with one strong Town weary an Invador's Army, and consume it, especially, if he be but able, with a small Force, to encamp near his Town besieged; for the Invador is thereby restrained from assaulking the same, for fear the Defendant's Camp should assail him in the mean time; the which worketh all for the Defendant, in winning of time, to the weakning and ruin of his Enemy's Army, the date whereof, as by daily Experience is found, is not above two or three Weeks Continuancy; for as your strong Towns avail wholly for the Defendant, and are only dangerous in civil and intestine Wars; for that such Towns revolting, work the like contrary effect against their Lord and Master, as they did before for him. For Examples and Presidents of this, you may behold what Effects the strong Towns of *France*, and the *Low Counties* have wrought against their Lords and Sovereign, insomuch, as we may say truly of them, they are a dangerous Good, wherefore I think this State most happy, in that our Sovereign hath a Realm so replenished with warlike People, as is this Country of *England*; whereby to be enabled at all times to front and give stop to an Enemy Invador; and as touching a rebellious number, we shall never need to doubt or fear them, as long as they shall want skilful Leaders and Governors to direct them, pay Armor, Munition, and other Necessaries to uphold them, wherewith her Majesty is plenteously furnished

nished; the want thereof will force Rebels, in few days, to disperse themselves, who being once broken, may presently be followed in gross, in such sort as they shall never be able to assemble and make head again. And what Leader of Skill and Judgment will undertake such an Enterprize in these Days, and not forecast, that a Power and Force assembled, cannot long stand without rich and strong Towns to supply their Wants; or at leastwise, without so much as is requisite to retain and keep an Army together in due Order and Obedience, without which there can grow nothing but Confusion and Ruin, be their numbers never so great.

But to my former matter again, if Men be so pitiful as they would seem, by taking such care of their Goods (which be but base and outward things, and to be remedied and recovered again) why have they not rather compassion for the Effusion of so much Blood, as must of necessity be wilfully made by so rash, furious, and unadvised an Encounter; a strong Course, some think, and never heard of before, that Men's Goods should be spoiled, or their Houses burnt, as though the main Action dependeth upon the Guard of every particular Man's Goods; and yet it was far from my Meaning or Writing, to burn any Houses or Buildings, as it is hardly gathered by some; but rather to draw your Cattle, Provision, &c. at your Backs, or towards the heart of the Realm, and that which you could not save, to waste and spoil as much as might be, that your Enemy take no Ad-

vantage thereof; which things, saith the Gentleman, are more easily wished than performed, and so may it be said of any thing that is most feasible; and yet every Soldier and Man of War can judge, that when you have drawn down to your place of Assembly (the which was wished to be within five or six Miles of the Sea Coasts, where the Enemy doth land) a sufficient Force to front and give the Enemy stop, then can he take no benefit of more than is left behind his Back, and so then is it easy enough to be performed. It is far off also from the Intention of an Invador himself, to burn the Houses, and spoil the Country, where he meaneth by Conquest to inhabit; and yet notwithstanding it is no such strange and admirable a thing to be done, for we see it a common usage in the cases of civil Policy, when an House happeneth to be on fire in any of our Towns, Men will often-times pull down four or five Houses before they fire, to save the rest: How many fair and beautiful Houses and Palaces, yea, and whole Subburbs have we seen rased and destroyed, during the time of the Civil Wars in *France* and *Flanders*, for the safety and better guard of their Cities and Towns; and yet none dar'ft resist and gainsay the same, or alienate his Mind from the States? yea, and doth not a Man in his own Body (which may aptly resemble a Country or Common-wealth) rather cut off a Finger, yea the whole Hand, if the case be required, than endanger the whole Body? And is it not likewise Wisdom and good Policy, that a Prince should
do

do the like, for the Safeguard of his Country, and yet shall not thereby alienate the the Subjects Minds from their Prince, as it is pre-supposed by the Gentleman; when the Question toucheth the whole to be in danger, a part is not to be respected or pitied; although it be no less loved than a Man doth his natural Finger or Hand. In sum, the general Safety of a Realm must be prefer'd before the private respect of a few; And as of Evils, the least is to be chosen, so of Advantage, the best and safest is to be embraced. To conclude, the Reasons and Examples to prove this matter good, are many and weighty: And I know not how they can be reasonably gainsaid, especially, if that Men (who will take upon them to judge and resolve what Course is best to be holden upon the difference aforesaid) had made any observation of the Actions of Princes and Men of War, in these our latter times; whose politick and wise doings, in all reason, must needs be a good Example and Warrant for us to imitate, because that Time and Experience maketh Men more exquisite in all Arts and Sciences, whereby the gross Errors of former Ages are deserned and reformed.

And lastly, I have thought good here, in some respects, to set down before you the chief points of my former Treatise, collected into as brief Notes of Direction as I could, that you may understand upon what Ground and Occasion I was then moved thereunto: Finding the Country People generally in that Untowardness and Disorder in martial Actions, and so unfurnished and
unable,

unable, as I thought our case most desperate to match and encounter with our mighty Enemies, beginning then to make shew of their Intentions and Designs; the which was presented unto some of the Lords of her Majesty's most honourable Privy Council, *Anno Dom. 1585.*

1. First, That in every Shire be appointed one Nobleman to take the chief Charge of the better ordering and governing of the same, to avoid Contempt.

2. And under him also, two principal Leaders, one of Footmen, and another of Horsemen, Men of Experience, Temperance and Judgment, as well in disposing of great numbers, as in taking Advantage of Grounds, Occasions, and Matters offered.

3. That your private Captains be chosen within the Shire, for two special Causes; the one, for that they serve without Wages; the other, for that the Country People more willingly incline to be directed by those, whom either for love or fear, they have born Obedience unto in their civil Government.

4. That there be Places appointed for the Assembly of some convenient number of Horsemen and Footmen, to be exercised and trained in all manner of sorts and forms, to be better enabled and taught how to give and receive a Charge.

5. That

5. That in every frontier Shire, there be also appointed Places of assemblies or rendezvouise, five or six Miles distant from the Sea side, whereunto the Country may resort upon the Enemy off the Beacons, to avoid that confused manner of running down to the Sea side accustomed; as also there to consult, what is meet to be done.

6. That in nowise you give an Invador battle, for that the Danger and Uncertainty thereof is such, as thereby you may hazard the Country.

7. Also it was shewed, how unlikely it should be, to prevent the landing of an Invador with your frontier Forces; and therefore to temporize with him is the surest Course, whereby you may grow stronger, and your Enemies weaker.

8. That an Enemy coming but to land, and burn, may be resisted by those that dwell within two or three Miles of the Sea Coast, to whose Aid and Succour the Horsemen of the whole Shire may be appointed to come to the seconding of them.

9. That you seek to prevail with your Navy, as much as is possible, either by Fight (if you be so provided, and have knowledge of their coming) or by other Disturbances of the quiet Passage of their Victuals.

10. To

10. To increase the numbers of Pikes as much as you may, being the chief Strength and Bulwark of an Army.

11. Not to place your Bills in the Core of your Battle, for disordering the same, when occasion shall offer, to drive them from execution.

12. That there be good choice made of those that shall be appointed for Weapon; and they to be all put under Captains; the rest to be employed as Pyoneers to the Spade and Shovel, the use whereof will stand you in great stead.

13. To have a store of Powder and Weapons in every Shire for supplying of the present Necessity, lest you want the same in time of need.

14. That there be good care had for the guard of the Beacons, for the more ready warning of the Country.

15. That the Hackneers and other mean Horses of the Shire be brought to the place of rendezvouze for mounting of numbers of Shot, to be more readily conveyed to the place of need.

Whereunto was also annexed a Direction for the best and most orderly retiring of an Army, whether in Champion or Straits; if at any time you were driven thereunto.

A certain, ready, and orderly Course for the speedy arming and bringing of Men together in the Shire of Kent, at an Alarm given to the Country; which, by like proportion, may be observed in any other Shire.

FIRST, the Shire of Kent is divided into certain Laths; and every Lath into certain Hundreds; and every Hundred into certain Parishes; and the Men inhabiting in them, are or ought to be sorted, either to be Soldiers or Py-
 oneers, every Soldier either appointed to be a Horseman, Pikeman, Halberder, Musketeer, Caliverman, or a Bowman; every Labourer to have his Pick-axe, Shovel, Spade, or Axe, and every of them his brown Bill. And in every Hundred there is, or should be appointed, one Captain over the Soldiers, and a Director or Overseer of the Labourers, upon an Alarm; the Constable and other Officers of every Hundred should be appointed to bring the Soldiers of every Parish to the Houses of them that have Arms and Weapons, to arm them and their Labourers; that they may be furnished likewise with Spades, Shovels and Mattocks, who being so furnished, shall draw to the center or middle part of the Hundred, where the Captains and other Leaders should be ready to take the Charge of them, and presently to march them to the center and middle part of every Lath, where there
 H should

should be a Colonel of that Lath, under whose Regiment the Captains of the Hundreds should be there to remain in a readines until the Lord Lieutenant of the Shire appoint them their place of Rendezvouze, to the which they shall then march orderly; this Order and Course being put in use and practice in every Shire throughout all *England*; the Men shall be very well armed, conducted, and led for the Defence of any part of the Realm, towards which the superior Commanders shall direct the point to be made to the Rendezvouze, where they mean to make head, and front the Enemy, the which, I wish so near to them as might be, and as your Ground will serve most conveniently for entring of your Forces, as well to stop their further incursion and passage into the Country, as also to prevent such Traytors, as before-hand combine to join themselves with the Enemy; and then may you daily, at your ease and pleasure, draw down such further Forces as you think mete; and if you will, having such infinite numbers of Labourers, you intrench them in round, until they starve for other Victuals or Relief than they have brought with them; shall they have none; now when you have brought down Forces sufficient to your liking, you may either fight or cover them with Earth works, which your Pyoneers and Labourers; which thing considered, it might be adjudged a most dangerous Folly, to hazard a rash and sudden fight by battle, especially with desperate Men. For I hold every Nation to be Lyons

ons in a foreign Country, in respect what they are when they fight at home, where they know their Places of retire, to save themselves by Flight; whereas the Invador hath no other means but by their Hands and Swords to return home again.

I doubt therefore, whensoever that time shall come, we may incur far greater Danger by the Courage of our great Commanders and Leaders, who, upon a forwardness to shew the same, will commit it to a Fight at the first landing of our Enemy, when we should by a temporizing and wiser Course; but let them, whenever they shall be, consider, that the Ground of all honourable Commendations is Vertue; and the Soul and Life of all Vertue is Wisdom, and Wisdom always driveth at the main end of the Action; and the end of their Service is not the vaunting or vindicating of their own Valour and Courage; but the honour of their Prince, and Safeguard of their Country. This scope, if they aim at, if to this they wisely bend all their desires and devises, then are they worthy and valorous Commanders, the present age shall renown them, and future time shall honour them; if otherwise, it is not their courage shall excuse them, our loss shall be their reproach; and this over-venturous forwardness, which rash and undiscerning Persons do now magnify for courage, shall be condemned always by wise Men for headiness and fury, and therefore let them propose before their Eyes, the famous example of that honourable *Fabius*, who by politick conduct of his dismayed

A Military DISCOURSE, &c.

Forces and delaying of battle till they might fight upon great Advantage, first tired, and then chased out the valiant *Hannibal*, and so by his exceeding great Moderation and Wisdom, preserved and restored his native Country, which the forwardness and courage of former Leaders had well nigh ruined, and by neglecting the Commendation of a forward Captain for the present, hath purchased to himself the everlasting Renown of a victorious Leader, and Father of his Country. But if you will needs give battle forthwith, then were it to be wished, that all Men should determine with themselves, not to look to fight any more battle, but that one, and in that respect it would please her Majesty to go herself in person, and with her to carry her Royal Crown of *England*, and ourselves to be so prepared in Mines, as that we determine that no Chronicles shall hereafter make mention that we did live, which God forbid, to see *England* lost, our worthy Sovereign vanquished or distressed, ourselves made Slaves, and Wives and Daughters led away Captives before our Faces: What true *English* Heart would live to hear his Children wail and cry upon the Sepulchre of their Grandfathers? and say, behold the dead Bodies of those that in their Lives defended the Freedom and Honour of *England*. And now behold our own Fathers, living Bodies that have utterly lost the same, and rendred us Captives to perpetual Slavery and Bondage.



APPENDIX.

*Nennius a worthy Britain, the very
Patern of a valiant, noble, and faithful
Subject; encountring with Julius Cæsar
at his first coming into this Island, was by
him Death-wounded, yet nevertheless, he
got Cæsar's Sword; put him to Flight:
Slew therewith Labienus a Tribune of the
Romans, endured Flight till his Country
men won the Battle, died fifteen Days af-
ter. And now encourageth all good Sub-
jects to defend their Country from the Pow-
er of foreign and usurping Enemies.*

About the Year before Christ, 52.

I MAY by right some later Writers blame,
Of Stories old, as rude or negligent:
Or else I may them well unlearned name
Or heedless, in those things about they went:
Some time on me, as well they might have spent:
As on such Traytors, Tyrants, Harlots those,
Which to their Countries, were the deadliest Foes.

Me

Me for myself, I would not this recite,
 Although I have Occasion good thereto,
 But sure methinks, it is too great Despite,
 These Men to others and their Country's do.
 For there are *Britains* neither one or two,
 Whose Names in Stories scarcely once appear :
 And yet their Lives, Examples worthy were,

'Tis worthy Praise (I grant) to write the ends.
 Of vicious Men, and teach the like beware :
 For what hath of Vertue that commends,
 Such Persons lewd, as nought of Vertues care :
 But for to leave out those praise-worthy are,
 Is like as if a Man had not the Skill,
 To praise the good but discommend the ill.

I crave no Praise, although myself deserv'd
 As great a Laud as any *Britain* yore :
 But I wou'd have it told how well I serv'd,
 My Prince and Country, Faith to both I bore :
 All noble Hearts, hereby with Courage more :
 May both their foreign Foes in fight withstand,
 And of their Enemies have the upper Hand.

Again to shew how valiant then we were,
 (You *Britains* good) to move your Hearts thereby,
 All other Nations less in fight to fear,
 And for your Country rather so to die
 With valiant haughtry Courage as did I :
 Than live in Bondage, Service, Slavery, Th'all
 Of foreign Powers, which hate your Manhood all.

Do give me leave to speak but e'en a while :
 And mark, and write this Story I thee tell.
 By North from *London*, more than fifty Mile :
 Here lies the Isle of *Ely* known full well :
 Wherein my Father built a Place to dwell,

And

And for because he liked well the same
He gave the Place he *Ely* hight his Name.

'Tis nam'd the Isle of *Ely* yet *Perdy*,
My Father nam'd it so, yet Writers miss.
Or if I may be bold to say they lye
Of him, which tell that far untruth like is.
What Truth (I pray you) seems to be in this?
He *Ely* lov'd, a goodly Place built there:
Most it delighted, reign'd not full a Year.

He reign'd forty Years as others tell,
Which seems as 'tis a Tale more true by far:
By Justice guided he his Subjects well,
And liv'd in Peace without the Broils of War.
His Children's noble Acts in Stories are.
In vulgar Tongue; but nought is said of me,
And yet I worry was, the young't of three.

His eldest Son and Heir was after King:
A noble Prince and he was named *Lud*:
Full poltick and wise in every thing,
And one that will'd his Country always good:
Such Uses, Customs, Statutes he withstood,
As seem'd to bring the publick Weals decay:
And then abolish'd, brake, repeal'd away.

So he the Walls of *Troy* the new renew'd,
Enlarg'd them made, with forty Tow'rs about,
And at the West side of the Wall he view'd
A Place for Gates to keep the Enemies out:
There made he Prisons for the poor bankrupt,
Nam'd *Ludgate* yet for Freedmen Debtors, free
From Hurt, till with their Creditors they agree,

Some say the City also took the Name
Of *Lud* my Brother, for he it repair'd,
And I must needs as true confess the same:
For why that time no cost on it he spar'd,
He still encreas'd and peopl'd every Ward:
And had them aye *Kaer Lud* the City call,
Or *Ludstone*, now you name it *London* all.

At length he died, his Chidren under age,
The Elder named was *Androgeus*,
Committing both unto my Brother's Charge:
The Younger of them hight *Tennancius*.
The *Britains* wanting aged Rulers thus,
Chooſe for that time *Cassibellane* their King,
My Brother Justice meant in every thing.

The *Roman* then the might *Caesar* fought,
Against the *Galls* and conquer'd them by Night,
When done he stood on Shores where see hemought,
The *Ocean* Seas and *Britain* clieves full bright,
(Quoth he) what Region lies there in my Sight,
Methinks some Island in the Seas I see:
Not yet subdued, nor vanquish't yet by me.

With that they told him we the *Britains* were,
A People stout, and fierce in Feats of War.
Quoth he, the *Romans* never yet with Fear,
Of Nation rude was daunted of so far:
We therefore mind, to prove them what they are,
And therewithal, the Letters hither sent,
By those Embassage brought, and thus they went.

C. Julius

C. Julius Cæsar Dict. of Rome, to Cassibellane King of Britain, sendeth greeting.

S I T H that the Gods have given us all the West,
As Subjects to our *Roman* Empire high:
By War or as it seemed *Jove* the best
Of whom we *Romans* came, and chiefly I,

Therefore to you which in the *Ocean* dwell,
As yet not underneath Subjection due:
We send our Letters greeting, were ye well
In warlike Cases, thus we deal with you.

First that you as the other *Regions* pay,
Us the Tribute yearly, *Romans* we require:
Then that you will with all the Force you may,
Withstand our Foes, as yours with Sword and Fire.

And thirdly that by these you Pledges send,
T' assure the Covenants once agreed by you.
So with your Danger less, our Wars may end:
Else bid we War, *Cassibellane* Adieu.

Cæsar.

No sooner were these *Cæsar's* Letter seen,
But straight the King for all his Nobles sent:
He shewed them what their Ancestors had been,
And pray'd them tell in this their whole Intent.
He told them whereabout the *Romans* went,
And what Subjection was, how servile they
Should be, if *Cæsar* bare their Pomp away.

And

I

And

And all the *Britains* even as set on fire,
 (Myself not least Inflamed was to fight)
 Did humbly him in joyful wife require.
 That he his Letters would to *Cæsar* write,
 And tell him plain we past not of his Spite.
 We past at little; of the *Romans* we,
 And less: than we of us, if less might be.

Wherefore the joyful King again reply'd,
 Through Counsel wise of all the Nobles had,
 By Letters he the *Romans* Hests deny'd:
 Which made the *Britains* haughty Hearts fall
 glad,
 No doubt the *Romans* more than half were mad,
 To hear his Letter written, thus they went:
 Which he again to mighty *Cæsar* sent.

Cassibellane's
Cassibellane King of Britain to C. Julius Cæ-
sar, Dicat. sendeth Answer.

A Shou O *Cæsar* write the Gods have given
 to thee,

The West: so I reply, they gave this
 Island me.

Thou sayest you *Romans*, and thyself of God's
 defend:

And dar'st thou then, to spoil our *Trojan* Blood
 pretend:

Again, though Gods have given thee all the
 World as thine:

That's parted from the World, thou get'st no
 Land of mine.

I

And

And sith likewise of God's we came, a Nation
free :

We owe no Tribute, Ayde, or Pledge, to
Rome or thee.

Retract thy Will, or wage thy War as likes
thee best.

We are to fight and rather than to Friendship
prest,

To save our Country from force of foreign Strife:
Each *Briton* here, is well content to venture
life,

We fear not of the End, or Dangers thou dost
tell :

But use thy Pleasure if thou may'st, thus fare
thou well.

Cassib.

When *Cæsar* had receiv'd his Answer so
It vext him much: He fully streight decreed,
To wage us War, and work us *Britains* woe:
Therefore he hasted hitherward with Speed,
We *Britons* eke prepared ourselves with heed
To meet the *Romans* all in warlike wise:
With all the Force and Speed we might devise.

We *Britons* then far deem'd it meeter much,
To meet him first at th' Entry on this Land:
Than to give an Entry here to such,
Might with our Victuals here ourselves withstand.
'Tis better for the Enemy to aband,
Quite from thy Borders a stranger Soil:
Than he at home, thee and thy Country spoil.

I 2

Wherefore

Wherefore we met him, at his Entry in,
 And pitch our Camps directly in his way:
 We minded sure to lose or else to win
 The Praise before we past from thence away.
 So when that both the Armies were in ray,
 And Trumpets blast on every side was blown:
 Our Minds to either eche, were quickly known,

We joynd battle, fiercely both we fought:
 The *Romans* to enlarge their Empire's Fame,
 And we with all the Force and Might we mought,
 To save our Country, and to keep our Name.
 O worthy *Britons* learn to do the same,
 We break the Rays of all the *Roman* Host:
 And made the mighty *Cæsar* leave his boast.

Yet he the worthiest *Captain* ever was.
 Brought all in Ray, and fought again anew:
 His skilful Soldiers he could bring to pass,
 At once for why his Trainings all they knew.
 No sooner I his noble Corps did view,
 But in I break amongst the *Captain's* Band,
 And there I fought with *Cæsar* hand to hand.

O God thou might'st have given a *Briton* Grace,
 I have slain the *Roman Cæsar* noble then:
 Which fought his Blood the *Britons* to deface,
 And bring in Bondage, valiant worthy Men.
 He never should have gone to *Rome* again,
 To fight with *Pampey*. or his Peers to slay,
 Or else to bring his Country in Decay.

It joy'd my Hart to strike on *Cæsar's* Chrest,
 O *Cæsar* that there had been none but we:
 I often made my Sword to try thy breast:
 But Lady Fortune did not look on me,
 I able was me-thought with *Cæsar's* three,

To try the Case: I made thy Heart to quake,
When on thy Chrest with mighty Strokes I strake.

The Strokes thou strok'st me, hurt me not at all:
For why thy Strength was nothing in respect,
But thou had'st bath'd thy Sword in Poyson all:
Which did my Wound, not deadly else infect.
Yet was I or I parted thence bewreckt,
I gat thy Sword from thee for all thy Fame:
And made thee fly for fear to eat the same.

For when thy Sword was in my Target fast,
I made thee fly, and quickly leave thy Hold:
Thou never wast in all thy Life so gast,
Nor durst again be ever half so bold.
I made a Number of *Romans* Hearts full cold,
Fight, fight, you noble *Britains* now (quoth I)
We never all will unrevenge'd die.

What *Cæsar* though thy Praise and mine be odd?
Perdy the Stories scarce remember me:
Though Poets all of thee do make a God,
Such simple Fools in making Gods they be,
Yet if I might my Case have try'd with thee,
Thou never had'st return'd to *Rome* again:
Nor of thy faithful Friends been basely slain.

A Number of *Britains* might'st thou there have
seen,
Death wounded fight, and spoil their spiteful Foes:
Myself mayn'd, slew and mangled mo I wene,
When I was hurt then twenty more of those.
I made the *Romans* Hearts to take their Hosc:
I all the Camp no *Roman* scarce I spy'd,
Durst half a Combat 'gainst a *Britain* bide.

At

At length I met a noble Man they call'd,
 Him *Labienus*, one of *Cæsar's* Friends,
 A Tribune erst he had made *Britain* thrald :
 Was one of *Cæsar's* Legates forth he sends.
 Well met (quoth I) I mind to make thee mends,
 For all thy Friendship to our Country crew :
 And so with *Cæsar's* Sword his Friend I fiew.

What need I name you every *Briton* here,
 As first the King, the Nobles all beside :
 Full stout and worthy Wights in War that were,
 As ever erst the stately *Romans* Tide.
 We fought so long they durst no longer byde,
 Proud *Cæsar* he for all his Brags and Boast :
 Flew back to Ships with all his scattered Hoste.

If he had been a God, as Sots him named,
 He could not of us *Britons* taken Foil :
 The Monarch *Cæsar* might have been ashamed,
 From such an Island with his Ships recoil,
 Or else to fly and leave behind the Spoil :
 But Life is sweet, he thought it better fly,
 Than hide amongst us *Britains* for to die.

I had his Sword was named *Croceanors*,
 With which he gave me in the Head a Stroke,
 The Venom of the which had such a Force,
 It able was, to pierce the Heart of Oak :
 No Medicine might the Poyson out revoke,
 Wherefore though scarce he pierced had the Skin :
 In fifteen Days my Brains it rancled in.

And then too soon (alas therefore) I died.
 I would to God he had return'd again :
 So that I might but once the Dastard spy'd,
 Before he went I had the Serpent slain.
 He play'd the Coward Cut-throat all too plain,

A beastly Serpent's Part that Beast detects :
Which or he fight, his Sword with bane infects.

Well then my Death brought *Cæsar* no re-
nown :

For both I gat thereby, eternal Fame,
And eke his Sword to strike his Friends a down :
I slew therewith his *Labiene* by name,
With Prince against my Country Foes I came :
Was wounded, yet did never faint, nor yield :
Till *Cæsar* with his Soldiers fled the Field.

Who would not venture Life in such a Case?
Who would not fight at Country's whole Request :
Who would not meeting *Cæsar* in the place,
Fight for Life, Prince and Country with the best ?
The greatest Courage is by Facts exprest.
Then for thy Prince with Fortitude as I
And Realms behofe, is Praise to live or die.

Now write my Life when thou hast Leisure, and
Will all thy Countrymen to learn by me,
Both for their Prince and native Land :
As valiant, bold and fearless for to be,
A Patern plain of Fortitude they see,
To which directly if themselves they frame :
They shall preserve their Country, Faith and
Fame.

F I N I S.

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
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1. The first step in the process is to identify the problem or issue that needs to be addressed. This involves gathering information and understanding the context of the problem.

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
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